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THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: ALFRED DUNHILL
OF LONDON, INC. V. REPUBLIC OF CUBA
John S. Williams*
I.

INTRODUCTION

With its decision in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba,I the Supreme Court has, for the third time in twelve
years, rendered a significant if not landmark ruling on the act of
state doctrine. 2 Before 1964 the Court had not decided a case involving that doctrine for more than twenty years. 3 During that
intervening period many questions were raised in the learned writings on the subject,4 and the controversial decision, Bernstein v.
N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, etc.,5 was decided by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York.
A.

The Doctrine

Three Supreme Court decisions later, sharp controversy remains
regarding the basis and the reach of the act of state doctrine, but
some aspects of that doctrine are now certain. First, the act of state
doctrine is not a limitation upon the court's jurisdiction, the
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. 44 U.S.L.W. 4665 (U.S. May 24, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Dunhill].

2. The other two cases are: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sabbatino]; First National City Bank v. Banco
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972), rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as FNCB].

3. The last case before Sabbatino decided by the Supreme Court which dealt
with the act of state doctrine was United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
4.

Commrrrz

ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF

A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES
COURTS (1959); Domke, Indonesian NationalizationMeasures Before Foreign
Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960); Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation
of Domestic Courts in the InternationalLegal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1961); House, Law Gone
Awry-Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 38 (1949); Hyde, Act
of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 635 (1959); Mann,
InternationalDelinquencies Before Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REV. 181 (1954);
Metzger, Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U. Prrr. L. REV. 881
(1962); Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 141 (1960); Seidl-Hohenvelden, ExtraterritorialEffects of Confiscations
and Expropriations,49 MICH. L. REV. 851 (1951); Zander, The Act of State
Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
5. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
NEW YORK,
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court's power over the parties.' Rather, it is a doctrine of judicial
restraint concerned with whether the subject matter before the
court is appropriate for judicial review. When applicable, the doctrine mandates judicial abstention.7 Secondly, the doctrine is a
principle of federal law-federal common law-not state law. 8
Thus, it is uniformly applicable in state and federal courts. Thirdly, it is not required by, nor is it a rule of, international law.,
Hence the arguments that the doctrine is subject to the rules of
international law,"0 or that the doctrine represents an exception to
the general rule that a court of the United States will decide cases
before it by choosing the appropriate rules for decision including
international law," miss the point. Fourthly, the act of state doctrine is not a conflict of laws rule.'" The act of state doctrine overrides normal conflict of laws analysis. 3 Lastly, as a corollary to the
act of state doctrine, the courts in the United States will not undertake to pass upon the validity of the act of an official of a foreign
state under the laws of that state, even if apparently invalid under
that law."
6. See Justice Powell concurring in the FNCB case, 406 U.S. at 773-74; Ricaud
v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr,
243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 956 (1968), rehearingdenied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968); Zander, The Act of
State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826, 831 (1959).
7. See note 6 supra. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d
845, 857 (2d Cir. 1962); Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-JudicialDeference
or Abstention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 88 (1972).
8. See Sabbatino at 424-27.
9. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),

aff'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968), rehearing
denied, 390 U.S. 1037 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, pt.
I, ch. 3, topic 1, tit. c, introductory note a, at 123 (1962).
10. See text accompanying notes 99-100 infra.
11. See Justice Rehnquist's opinion in FNCB, at 763. Compare The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).

12. See Comment, The Act of State Doctrine-Its Relation to Private and
Public InternationalLaw, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (1962); Compare the Second
Circuit decision in the Sabbatino case, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir. 1962).
13. Compare the application of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the International
Monetary Fund Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 2332, 2
U.N.T.S. 185. See Williams, ExtraterritorialEnforcement of Exchange Control
Regulations under the InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L
L. 319, 379-86 (1975).
14. In Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294 (1808), Chief Justice
Marshall declared: "The sovereign power possessing jurisdiction over the thing,
must be presumed, by foreign tribunals, to have exercised that jurisdiction properly." This principle has been followed since. Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d
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B.

The Exceptions to the Doctrine

The Supreme Court and Congress have, however, made exceptions to the broad application of the act of state doctrine. First, the
Sabbatino decision itself recognizes that the act of state doctrine
does not apply in the face of a "treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles."" Article VIII, section
2(b) of the International Monetary Fund Agreement is an example
of such a treaty provision."5 The Hickenlooper amendment also
carved out another exception:
no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the
federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which
a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party
including a foreign state .. .based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking. . . by an act of that state in violation
of the principles of international law . . .[unless] the President
determines that the application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case [and so informs the court].
Following the decision in the FNCB case it seems clear that the
Hickenlooper amendment exception is limited to actions related to

specific property.

8

A possible third exception is the so-called

547, 558 (5th Cir. 1962), motion denied, 314 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 914 (1963), rehearingdenied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963); Pons v. Republic of
Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1962), rehearing
denied, 368 U.S. 1005 (1962); Pasos v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271,
272 (2d Cir. 1956); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d
246, 249 (2d Cir. 1947); United States ex rel. Von Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d
650, 652, 653 (2d Cir. 1947); United States ex rel. Steinvorth v. Watkins, 159 F.2d
50, 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1947); Union Shipping & Trading Co. v. United States, 127
F.2d 771, 774 (2d Cir. 1942); Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d
438, 443 (2d Cir. 1940); The Cloveresk, 264 F.276 (2d Cir. 1920); Hewitt v. Speyer,
250 F. 367 (2d Cir. 1918); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 133 F. Supp. 522
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), modified and aff'd, 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 871 (1956), rehearingdenied, 352 U.S. 913 (1956); Eastern States Petroleum
Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). In
Sabbatino the Supreme Court endorsed this principle, 376 U.S. at 415, n.17,
confirming a similar pronouncement by the court below, 307 F.2d 845, 859 (2d
Cir. 1962).
15. 376 U.S. at 428.
16. Williams, supra note 13, at 387-94.
17. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
18. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank, 431 F.2d 394
(2d Cir. 1970) vacated, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971), afJ'd, 442 F.2d 530 (1971); Lowen-

feld, Act of State and Department of State: FirstNational City Bank v. Banco
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"Bernstein exception," thoroughly critiqued in FNCB and discussed hereinafter.' 9 A possible fourth exception, suggested in Sabbatino and elaborated in Dunhill, may exist when a clear rule of
international law applies.2" Sabbatino does not give an example of
such a rule,' but Dunhill suggests the international rules governing commercial dealings."
With its decision in Dunhill the Supreme Court did not reexamine in depth the theoretical basis for the act of state doctrine.
Rather, the Court
determined that the act involved was not an
"act of state," 3 and four Justices went on to contend that the
doctrine "should not be extended to include the repudiation of a
purely commercial obligation." 4 This contention may amount to
another exception to the act of state doctrine.
II.

BACKGROUND FOR THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN

Dunhill CASE
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba presents a
THE

three-cornered dispute in which pre-Castro owners of five leading
manufacturers of Havana cigars brought an action against three
United States cigar importers, Saks, Faber and Dunhill, to recover
the price for pre-takeover cigar shipments and for other relief.5

The Cuban Government, which had nationalized or "intervented"26 the manufacturers' businesses in September 1960, was
permitted to intervene in the action. The Government interventors
Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795, 801, 803 (1972). But cf. Judge Keating's
dissent in French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 76-93, 242 N.E.2d
704, 723-34, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 460-74 (1968), where he argued that the term
"property" in the Hickenlooper amendment included ascertainable contractual

rights.
19.

See text accompanying notes 101-10, 134-47 infra.

20. 376 U.S. at 428: "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4672.
21. Compare the curious case, New York Times Co. v. Commission on Human
Rights, 79 Misc.2d 1046, 362 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1974), noted, 16
HARV. INT'L L. J. 456 (1975).
22. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4672. See text accompanying notes 167-68 infra.
23. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4668-69. See also text accompanying notes 86-88 infra.
24. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4669-73.
25. The owners also sought relief for trademark infringement and unfair competition.
26. "Intervention" is the term used by the Cuban Government to describe its
seizure of businesses. "Interventors" are those installed by the Government to

operate the business.
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asserted claims against the importers for the proceeds of postintervention cigar shipments. The importers counterclaimed
against the interventors for amounts paid to the interventors after
intervention but for shipments made before intervention.
A.

The District Court

The District Court made the following dispositions: (a) granted
judgment to the owners against the importers for the price of preintervention shipments of cigars; 7 (b) held the importers liable to
the interventors for cigars shipped after intervention;28 and (c) held
that the importers were entitled to a setoff and "on Dunhill's
claim" to an affirmative judgment against the interventors for
amounts mistakenly paid to them for pre-intervention shipments.
Two of the importers, Saks and Faber, were entitled to setoffs and
Dunhill was entitled to ain affirmative judgment of approximately
$55,650.29 All parties appealed.
B.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals

The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the owners against
the importers for the price of pre-intervention shipments of cigars
mistakenly paid to the interventors. The court, per Mansfield, J.,
stated that the Cuban Government's purported seizure of the owners' accounts receivable "is contrary to our own domestic policy"
and the act of state doctrine does not apply.3 ° The court reasoned
that the situs of a debt is where the debtor may be found, and "for
purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not 'located' within
a foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or collect

it.' 31 Thus, the intervention did not deprive the owners of their
right to collect the accounts receivable that the importers owed
27. The sums due from the importers to the owners for the preintervention
shipment of cigars were approximately: Saks, $6,600; Faber, $322,000; and Dunhill, $148,600.
28. The sums due from the importers to the interventors were approximately:
Saks, $24,250; Faber, $582,588; and Dunhill, $92,949.
29. The District Court further held that both the importers and interventors
had infringed the owner's trademark rights under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1114(1)(a) and 1125(a), and the importers were found guilty of unfair competition, but injunctive relief, damages or an accounting for profits were denied.
30. 485 F.2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir. 1973). In the Second Circuit, the Dunhill case
was styled Menendez v. Saks & Co. [references to the Second Circuit opinion
hereinafter cited as Menendez].
31. The situs of a debt for purposes of the act of state doctrine is discussed in
part HI infra.
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them. Further, the court rejected the argument that the district
court erred in failing to apply Cuban currency regulations which
would limit the owners to the ultimate receipt of pesos rather than
dollars. The mode of payment made the contracts performable
both in Cuba and in New York, and the "law governing the agreement is that of the place of performance actually chosen," which
was New York. Even assuming that Cuban law governed, its currency regulations applied only after the dollars were received by
the owners. The court also refused to give Cuban currency regulations extraterritorial effect under article VIII, section 2(b) of the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, since
Cuba was no longer a party to the Fund Agreement or a member
of the Fund." On appeal, none of the parties further disputed that
the importers were liable to the interventors for the price of cigars
shipped after the intervention.
Finally, the Second Circuit affirmed the allowance of the importers' counterclaim against the interventors, but only up to the
amount of the interventors' claims.13 The interventors had argued
that the act of state doctrine precluded the importers from any
recovery on their counterclaims. The court, however, stated that:
(1) the quasi-contractual obligations on which the counterclaims
were based had their situs in Cuba; (2) the quasi-contractual obligations were subject to the act of state doctrine; (3) an informal
act may constitute an act of state; 34 (4) the Hickenlooper amendment did not apply; but (5) the Supreme Court decision in First

National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba35 did apply and

32. Cuba withdrew from the Fund on April 2, 1964. Pan American Life Ins.
Co. v. Blanco, 362 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1966); Confederation Life Association v.
Vega Y Arminan, 207 So.2d 33 (3d Fla. D.C. App. 1968), aff'd mem., 211 So.2d
169 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 980 (1968); Williams, supra note 13, at 35152. Also, it can be argued that the interventors, as alter ego for for the Cuban
Government, should not have been permitted to use the courts of a foreign country in attempting to enforce its own public laws. See Banco do Brazil S.A. v. A.C.
Israel Commodity Co. Inc., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872
(1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); Williams, supra note 13, at 372-73. But
this argument was rejected by the court in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 437. See part
IV infra.
33. 485 F.2d at 1373-74.
34. The District Court deemed a formal act of state essential. 345 F. Supp.
at 545. The Court of Appeals, 485 F.2d at 1371, held that the test is not whether
the act was formal or informal but whether it was within the scope of authority
of the representative of the foreign government, citing Underhill v. Hernandez,
168 U.S. 250 (1897). What constitutes an "act of state" is discussed in part V

infra.
35.

406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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upheld the importers' counterclaims in the present case up to
the limits of the respective claims asserted against them by the
interventors. This result is mandated, the Court of Appeals
stated, by application of the Bernstein v. N.V. NederlandscheAmerikaansche36 and National City Bank v. Republic of China"
cases.3"
C.

The Issues Before the Supreme Court

Three petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court,
and on May 13, 1974, the Court granted the petition of the importer, Dunhill, 9 and directed counsel to brief and argue two questions:
1. Can statements by counsel for the Republic of Cuba, that petitioner's unjust enrichment counterclaim would not be honored, constitute an act of state?
2. If so, is an exception to the act of state doctrine created under
First National City Bank v.Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972), where petitioner's counterclaim does not exceed the net balance owed to Cuba on its claims by petitioner's codefendants, and
where all claims and counterclaims arise out of the subject matter
in litigation in this case?
The case was argued orally in December 1974,4o but was thereafter
restored to the calendar for reargument with the further question:
"Should this Court's holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 298 (1964), be reconsidered?"' Reargued on
January 19, 1976,42 the case was decided on May 24, 1976.11 Justice
36. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
37. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
38. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the District Court's disposition of the
trademark infringement and unfair competition issues. Review of those issues was
not sought in the Supreme Court.
39. No. 73-1288, 416 U.S. 981 (1974). The issue raised by the Dunhill petition
and addressed by the Court is whether the failure of the interventors to return to
Dunhill funds paid by Dunhill after intervention for cigars sold prior to intervention was an "act of state" by Cuba, thus precluding an affirmative judgment for
Dunhill.
The Court held the petitions Nos. 73-1287 and 73-1289 until its decision in the

Dunhill case and then denied those petitions. 44 U.S.L.W. 4668 n.6.
40. 43 U.S.L.W. 3341 (1974).
41. 422 U.S. 1005 (1975). Of the nine Justices who sat on the Sabbatino bench
only three, Justices Brennan, Stewart and White, are on the Court today.

42. 44 U.S.L.W. 3427.
43. 44 U.S.L.W. 4665.
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White delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and by Justice
Stevens, in part. Justice Marshall wrote the dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun. The remarkable feature of
the Supreme Court's opinion is that after the case was twice extensively briefed and twice argued, the Court took up and settled so
few of the outstanding issues of the act of state doctrine.
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and granted an
affirmative judgment for Dunhill on its counterclaim. In reversing,
the majority agreed only that the interventors' refusal to return to
Dunhill payments for the pre-intervention shipments of cigars was
not an "act of state" entitled to respect in our courts.44 Without
Justice Stevens, Justice White and the three remaining Justices
argued that, in any event, the "concept of an act of state should
not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial
obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial
instrumentalities," reasoning that to do so would not be "consistent with" the "restrictive approach to sovereign immunity."45 The
dissent argued that the repudiation was a part of a course of conduct initiated by the intervention decree and that course of conduct was the "act of state" which barred Dunhill's affirmative
claim. Further, the dissent said that this case was not an appropriate one in which to lay down a broad "commercial act" exception
to the doctrine. Nor should the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity be marshalled in support of such an exception. 6 The following sections of this article deal with a number of the issues
regarding the act of state doctrine raised in the course of the litigation of this case.
III.

FOR PURPOSES OF THE ACr OF STATE DOCTRINE THE SITUS OF A
DEBT IS WHERE THE DEBTOR CAN BE FOUND

A fundamental qualification to the act of state doctrine limits
its application to acts of a sovereign done within its own territory. 47
44. Id. at 4669.
45. Id. at 4669-73.
46. Id. at 4676-82.
47. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428, 432. See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Laane & Baltser v. Estonian
State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line [1949] Can. S.Ct. 530, 546-51; In re Amand
(No. 2), [19421 1 K.B. 445; Aksionairnoye Obschestro A.M. Luther v. James
Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.); Government of the Republic of Spain v.
National Bank of Scotland Ltd. [1939] Sess. Cas. 413, 426 (Inner House);
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The Dunhill Court said, "United States courts will not give effect
to foreign government confiscations without compensation of property located in the United States."48 Thus, the courts of one state
are not bound by the act of state doctrine to give effect, as a matter
of course, to the acts of a second state which purport or are alleged
to affect property or rights in some other state. An act of state may
be given extraterritorial effect, however, if the act is consistent
with the laws and policy of the forum state.49 A fortiori, an act of
state which purports to affect property or rights in another state
and which is repugnant to the policy or laws of that other state will
be wholly disregarded in the other state 0 Thus, the situs of a
bank account or other tangible property, or accounts receivable or
other intangible property, is of critical importance.5 1 The Dunhill
Court, citing with apparent approval Republic of Iraq v. FirstNational City Bank, 2 stated that the situs of the accounts receivable
for the pre-intervention cigar shipments was with the importerdebtors in New York rather than with the interventors in Cuba. 3
§ 48, at 172 (1962).
This qualification obtains despite the Supreme Court's shift in Sabbatino from
the traditional bases for this doctrine, sovereignty, comity and international law,
to the "constitutional underpinnings" basis. See discussion in part VI infra; Hen-

EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS,

kin, The ForeignAffairs Power of the Federal Courts:Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L.R.
805, 826-30 (1964).
48. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4667.
49. Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Menendez, 485 F.2d at 1364. See also

Tabacalera Severiano Jorge v. Standard Cigar Company, 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
The basis for granting extraterritorial effect to an act of state which is consistent with the laws and policy of the forum state is "comity." See Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113 (1895); State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455
(2d Cir. 1953); Anderson v. N.V. Transandine, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942);
State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 79 F. Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
See also, Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 378, 189 N.E. 456, 460
(1934); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S.
284, aff'd mem. 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927).
50. In Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, because shares in a
Canadian investment trust were involved, the court raised but did not decide
whether a court sitting in the United States ought to consider whether a Canadian
court would regard the confiscation decree as consistent with Canadian policy.
353 F.2d 47, 51 & n.3.
51. In Menendez, the Second Circuit rejected interventor's argument attempting to distinguish the Republic of Iraq case on the ground that it involved
tangible property-a bank account. 485 F.2d at 1356.
52. 353 F.2d 47.
53. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4667. The dissent reserved opinion on this point: "[I]t is
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Generally, under United States law, the situs of a debt or intangible property "is about as intangible a concept as is known to the
law." 4 Various rules have been developed. 5 For purposes of the act
of state doctrine, which is a rule of federal common law, federal
common law principles must be applied." Both the Second and
Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal have stated that for purposes of
applying the act of state doctrine the situs of the debt is within the
state whose courts can compel payment, i.e., the state where the
debtor can be found. In the Republic of Iraq case 57 the Second
Circuit affirmed the District Court dismissal of Iraq's complaint
where Iraq, based upon an "ordinance" purporting to confiscate
without compensation all of King Faisal II's property, sought to
recover a bank account and certain shares of stock held in a New
York bank. The situs of the debt was a principal issue. The court
decided that the test for determining the situs of the debt is the
place where courts can compel the bank to pay the balance or to
deliver the certificates, saying: "So far as appears on this record,
only a court in the United States could compel the bank to pay the
balance in the account or to deliver the certificates it held in custody. The property here at issue was thus within the United
States." Similarly, in Tabacalera Severiano Jorge v. Standard
Cigar Company" the Fifth Circuit Court reversed the District
not necessary for us to consider the [interventors' contention that the initial
taking reached the accounts receivable] here." Id. at 4676.
54. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge v. Standard Cigar Company, 392 F.2d 706,
714 (5th Cir. 1968) (per Judge Tuttle), discussed at note 59 infra.

55. The situs may be in one place for tax and escheat purposes (FarmersLoan
& Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1929); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S.

674 (1963)) or in more than one place for tax purposes (Curry v. McCanless, 307
U.S. 357 (1939)). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 65 and 68
(1971), rather than assign a situs to a debt, attempts to resolve disputes in terms
of the power of the court to exercise judicial jurisdiction. See also, Atkinson v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 348, 316 P.2d 960, 964 (1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S.
569 (1958); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1904); EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§§ 100-103 (1962); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 109-112 (Scoles, 4th ed. 1964).
56. Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir.
1965), citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423-27. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
Foreign Relations Laws § 43 Comment (d).
57. The case is noted: 1966 Duke L.J. 828 (1966); 1 INT'L LAW. 146 (1966); 28
OHIO ST. L.J. 149 (1967); 6 VA. J.

INT'L

L. 341 (1966); 2 TEXAs

INT'L

L.J. 285

(1966). The District Court decision in this case, 241 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
is noted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 120 (1966); 7 HARv. INT'L L. CLUB J. 316 (1966).
58. 353 F.2d at 51.
59. 392 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968), noted in
62 AM. J. INT'L L. 978 (1968); 3 NT'L LAw. 176 (1968); 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 184 (1969).

Fall 1976]

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

Court and held the act of state of the Cuban Government in
taking over a Cuban corporation did not bar a suit by the Cuban
corporation and its sole stockholder for a debt owed to the Cuban
corporation by a Florida company because the situs of the debt was
in Florida, not Cuba. The Court explicitly rejected the fiction that
the situs is irrevocably at the domicile of the creditor 0 The rule
laid down in these cases is based upon the territorial authority of
the court, not upon the nationality of the person from whom the
property was confiscated.
The views and the rationale set forth in the Republic of Iraq and
Tabacaleracases were adopted and followed by the Second Circuit
in the Dunhill case, where the court said: "For purposes of the
act of state doctrine, a debt [the accounts receivable owed by the
importers, Dunhill] is not 'located' within a foreign state unless
that state has the power to enforce or collect it." That is, the state
must have power to enforce payment of the debt.6 The Supreme
Court has now, apparently, approved this analysis as to the situs

of a debt for act of state purposes.
IV. THE

CONFLICT

OF LAWS AND THE QUASI-CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION

In order to reach the act of state issue in Dunhill, the entire
Supreme Court accepted without discussion or analysis, the Second Circuit's determination that the interventors had a quasicontractual obligation to repay Dunhill and the other importers,
and that the obligation arose in Cuba.12 The District Court had
ruled that the quasi-contractual obligation arose in the United
States and was thus not repudiated by a Cuban act of state." The
Second Circuit, however, ruled that the quasi-contractual obligation arose only after the funds had been received or used by the
interventors and a demand had been made by the importers for
their return. The obligation did not grow out of the importers'
mistaken payments, which were due and payable in New York, or
60. 392 F.2d at 716.
61. 485 F.2d at 1364-65. Accord, United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 392
F. Supp. 266, 269 (S,D.N.Y. 1975); Rupali Bank v. Provident National Bank, 403
F. Supp. 1285, 1289-90 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Zeevi v. Grindlays Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 220,
228-29, 331 N.E.2d 502, 370 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866
(1975).
62. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4667, 4676.

63. Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 545 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
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because the mistaken payments had been made by checks drawn
on New York banks. 64
Applicable conflict of laws principles require that the local law
of Cuba, the place where the claim arose, should govern the rights
and liabilities of the parties.6 5 Curiously, neither the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court in Dunhill pursued this line of analysis. Apparently, it was not pressed by the interventors. On this
foundation the Court went on to decide the act of state issues.
V.

ACT OF STATE-THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWER

On the essential criteria by which to determine whether an act
is an "act of state" the Justices of the Supreme Court in Dunhill
were virtually unanimous: the actor must be invested with sovereign or governmental authority, as distinguished from mere commercial or other authority. Furthermore, he must exercise that
sovereign authority by acting or refraining from acting for an "act
of state" to exist."6 Or, as the dissent stated: "If the foreign state
has exercised a sovereign power either to act or to refrain from
acting, there is an act of state." 7 While the Court does not describe
all other facets of an "act of state," and consequently does not
allay all doubts, the dissent notes that an "act of state" can be an
affirmative act" as well as an intentional refusal to act.69 It can be
a formal act, as the Court notes, such as enactment of a statute or
adoption of a decree, order, or resolution.7 An act of state can also
be an informal act such as a taking of lead bullion or hides in
wartime.7 In any event, the dissent stated:
I do not understand the Court to suggest. . . that the act of state
doctrine can be triggered only by a "statute, decree, order or resolution" of a foreign government, or that the presence of an act of state
can only be demonstrated by some affirmative action by the foreign
sovereign.7
64. 485 F.2d at 1370.
65. Industrial Export & Import Corp. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking
Corp., 302 N.Y. 342, 98 N.E.2d 466 (1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS

§ 221.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

44 U.S.L.W. at 4668, 4669.
Id. at 4677.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4669.
Id. at 4677.

72.

Id. at 4676-77.
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Further, majority and dissent in Dunhill agree that an oral or a
written statement by legal counsel in the case does not constitute
an act of state.73 Indeed, counsel for Cuba and the interventors
frequently stated that he, as an attorney, could not commit an "act
7
of state.1
Again, an act is an act of state, according to the Restatement, if
it is done by or for a sovereign state within its own territory, or
territory over which it has de facto or de jure jurisdiction, and is
done to give effect to its public interest. It may be either formal or
informal in nature, and it may be the act of the executive, legislative or judicial branch. But a court judgment is not usually considered an act of state because it does not ordinarily reflect high state
policy. 75 A typical act of state is the taking by a state of property
of its own nationals within its own territory. Illustrative of the acts
found to be acts of state by the courts are: an expropriation by
Cuba of branch banks within Cuba; 76 a decision aimed at halting
the flow of foreign reserves from Cuba; 77 a seizure of a cargo of
sugar while it was in Cuba; 78 a decree nationalizing insurance businesses in Russia; 79 a decree expropriating assets of a Russian corpo73. Id. at 4669, 4678.
74. 43 U.S.L.W. 3341 (1974). He went on to assert that the act of state in the
Dunhill case is the refusal of Cuba to return the money that it received based
upon the decree nationalizing the relevant accounts receivable. See, Respondents'
Brief, at 16.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 41, Comment (d), illustrations 4-8 (1962). See also Sabbatino, 304 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir. 1962).
76. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972),
rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972). See also Maltina Corp. v. Cany Bottling
Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972) (law dissolving Cuban corporation); Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 960 (1962), rehearingdenied, 368 U.S. 1005 (1962) (Cuban
seizure of its own national's property within its own territory); National Institute
of Agrarian Reform v. Kane, 153 So.2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (decree
expropriating property of Cuban corporation in Cuba); Mann v. Compania Petrolera Trans-Cuba, S.A., 32 Misc.2d 790, 223 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (law
confiscating Cuban company); Luther v. James Sagor & Co., L.R. [1921] 3 K.B.
532 (decree confiscating a quantity of plywood in Russia by Russian Government).
77. French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968).

78. See also The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938) (Spanish Government allegedly confiscated ship by decree); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F.2d 246
(2d Cir. 1947) (alleged compelled conveyance under physical duress of the shares
of Arnold Bernstein Lines); The Claveresk, 264 F. 276 (2d Cir. 1920) (British
requisition of merchant ship in World War I).
79. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See also Guaranty Trust Co.
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ration including a deposit account with a bank in New York;"0 a
decree expropriating real property located in Mexico;"1 a taking in
Mexico of lead bullion by a general in the Carranza Army;8 2 a
confiscation of hides in Mexico to satisfy an assessment by order
of General Villa;83 a taking by the Costa Rican military of a banana
plantation and railroad under de facto Costa Rican jurisdiction;"
and a refusal to grant a passport, confinement to house, and physical assaults by soldiers. 5
In Dunhill the Court examined the alleged act of state-the
Cuban Government's refusal to return the funds mistakenly paid
to it by Dunhill. The Court refrained from finding this act to be a
part of a broad course of conduct. Further, the Court concluded
that the interventors had not sustained their burden of proving
v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (assignment to the United States of all sums
due the Russian Government); Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266
N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 898 (1934) (decree declaring that thereafter the business of
insurance should be an exclusive monopoly of the state).
80. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). See also Pasos v. Pan
American Airways Inc., 299 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956) (formal and informal
acts-turn over of lands to U.S. Marines, condemnation of lands and prohibition
of buildings within a radius of 500 meters of any air field without governmental
approval).
81. Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937). See also Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (Mexican
decree expropriating oil wells); Salinoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220,
186 N.E. 679 (1933) (Russian Government confiscated all oil lands in Russia).

82, Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918). Cf. Banco de Espana
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) (law and decree conferring
the right to transfer a quantity of silver).
83. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See also Hewitt v.
Speyer, 250 F. 367 (2d Cir. 1918) (payment by Ecuador to defendant of money
earmarked for payment to bondholders).
84. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See also
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Calif.
1971), afJ'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972)
(alleged conspiracy among Trucial states and others to deny plaintiffs "richest"
off-shore oil concessions); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) (Venezuelan regulatory authorities compelled defendants to deny plaintiffs Venezuelan crude oil). See also Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 23-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Occidental of Umm Al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975).
85. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). See also United States ex
rel. Von Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1947) (physical act of arrest,
detention and delivery of person to U.S. authorities in Costa Rica); Holzer v.
Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474 (1938) (plaintiff discharged from
job in Germany on the ground that he was a Jew even though he had an employment contract).
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that the claimed act was an act of state. The majority argued that
the refusal to repay, by itself, is insufficient to prove an act of
state, nor does it prove that the interventors were invested with
sovereign authority to repudiate the debts of the cigar businesses.8
And, as in The Gul Djemal, 7 where a duly commissioned officer
of the Turkish navy was the master of a steamship owned and operated by the Turkish Government for commercial purposes, the
only authority the master was shown to be invested with was commercial authority.80 A similar commercial authority was possessed
by the interventors in Dunhill. Thus, the Court limited the reach
of the act of state doctrine. The dissent, on the other hand, argued
that the interventors' course of conduct in taking the cigar businesses and in receiving and retaining Dunhill's money reflects an
exercise of sovereign power and amounts to an act of state.88 Justice
White would go a step further: even when the actor is invested with
sovereign authority and purports to exercise that authority, if the
act is committed in the course of "purely commercial operations"
that act is not an act of state. 0
VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RATIONALE FOR THE AcT OF STATE
DOCrRINE AND THE "BERNSTEIN ExcEPTION"

A.

Pre-SabbatinoRationale: Sovereignty, Comity, International
Law

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino"'it was generally asserted that the bases for the
act of state doctrine were notions of sovereignty, comity, and inter2 Chief Jusnational law. In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,1
tice Marshall alluded to the sovereign power of a nation as a basis
for the doctrine. 3 Sovereignty clearly appears to be the foundation
86. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4668.
87. 264 U.S. 90, 95 (1924). See also The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 434 (1818);
The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S. 151 (1922).
88. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4668.
89. Id. at 4676-78.
90. Id. at 4673. Interestingly, the sole decisive issue in Dunhill was whether
the repudiation of the quasi-contractual obligation was an act of state, yet the
Court did not give the interventors an opportunity to clarify the nature of the act.
It simply reversed, thereby ending the litigation. It did not remand the case for
further proceedings. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4673.
91. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
92. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
93. The act of state doctrine stems from the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir. 1962); Note, The Castro Government in
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of the Court's opinions in Underhill v. Hernandez94 and American
Banana Company v. United Fruit Company. 5 But in Oetjen v.
Central Leather Company8 the Supreme Court broadened the
basis of the doctrine, asserting that it "rests at last upon the highest considerations of comity and expediency," concluding: "To
permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very
certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and
vex the peace of nations.' , Also, considerations of international
law have been urged as a basis for the doctrine.98 No exceptions to
the doctrine as stated in these cases were recognized by American
courts, although it had been urged that the doctrine did not apply
if the foreign act of state was contrary to the public policy of the
forum, was in violation of the constitution of the country where it
took place, or was in violation of the rules of international law. 9
American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARV.
L.REV. 1607, 1608 (1962). But see, Justice Rehnquist's statement in the FNCB
case, 406 U.S. at 762. See also, Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293, 294
(1808); Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 2 H.L. Cas. 1, 17, 21 (1848).

94. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
95. 213 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1909).
96. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
97. Id. at 303-04. See also, Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937); Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918), and compare the leading British
case, Luther v. James Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.).
Comity is the recognition extended by one nation within its own territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law but one of
practice, convenience and expediency. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing
Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
98. Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, 599 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876); Kennedy v. Cossillis,
2 Swans 313, 326, 36 Eng. Rep. 635, 640 (Ch. 1818). See, Delson, The Act of State
Doctrine-JudicialDeference or Abstention?, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 90 (1972);
Henkin, The ForeignAffairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM.
L.R. 805, 826-30 (1964). But "the practice of nations" is evidence that "international law does not require application of the doctrine." Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-22 (1964); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, § ll5aa
(Lauterpracht, 8th ed. 1955); But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW, § 41 Comment (c).
99. COMM. ON INT'L LAW, BAR ASS'N CITY OF N.Y., A RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES COURTS (1959); Domke, Indonesian
NationalizationMeasures Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960);
Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine and the Rules of Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 635
(1959); Mann, InternationalDelinquenciesBefore Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REV.
181 (1954); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959).
Contra, Reeves, Act of State Doctrineand the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 AM. J.
INT'L L. 141 (1960).
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There are also a number of British and European decisions to the
effect that foreign acts of state that violate international law would
not be recognized as enforceable by the forum. '
However, in Sabbatino, Justice Harlan argued that the plain implication of

statements in Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 304, and Shapleigh, 299 U.S. at 471, is that "the
act of state doctrine is applicable even if international law has been violated."
376 U.S. at 431. But it has been argued that if the Sabbatino court had found
the act of Cuba in flagrant disregard of international law, it would not have
applied the act of state doctrine. Mann, The Legal Consequences of Sabbatino,
51 VA. L. REv. 604, 607-8 (1965).
100. See the following cases:
Great Britain:Wolf v. Oxholm, 6 Maule & Selwyn 92 (1817); In re Fried Krupp
[1917] 2 Ch. 188; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfuls Brothers and Co. [1883] 38 Ch.
D. 348; Banco de Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria [1935] 1 K.B. 140;
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaifrate [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246, [1953] Int'l L. Rep.

316 (Sup. Ct. Aden); N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. The War
Damage Commission [1956] Int'l L. Rep. 810 (Singapore Ct. App.); Re Helbert
Wagg & Co., [1956] Ch. 323, 346; Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer [1975] 2
W.L.R. 425, 433-35.
Austria: Obester Gerichtshof, 94 Clunet 941 (1967) S.Ct. 1965.
France: Ropit Case, [1929] S.Jr.I, 217, 55 Clunet 674 (1928), [1927-1928]
Ann. Dig. 67, (No. 43); Volatron v. Moulin [1939] Dalloz I 329, [1938-1940]
Ann. Dig. 24 (No. 10) (Cour d'Appel, Aix, 1939); Soci6t6 Postasas Ibericas v.
Nathan Bloeh [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 150 (Cour de Cassation); Braden Copper
Co. v. Le Groupement d'Importation des Metaux, 12 Int'l L. Materials 187 (Ct.
of Extended Jurisdiction Paris, 1972); Compagnie Francaise de Credit et de
Banque v. Consorts Atard (Cour d'Appel Amiens, 1970) 98 Clunet 86 (1971);
Credit Foncier d'Algerie et de Tunisie v. Narbonne (Cour de Cassation, 1969) 96
Clunet 912 (1969); Volation v. Moulin [1938-1940] Ann. Dig. 24 (Cour d'Appel
Aix).
Germany: In the Matter of Minera El Teniente, S.A., 12 INT'L L. MATERIALS
251 (Sup. Ct. Hamburg 1973); N.V. Verenigde Deli-Maatschapijen v. DeutscheIndonesische Tabak-Handelgesellschaft m.b.H. (Bremen Ct. App.) (See Domke,
supra note 99 at 313, 314); Confiscation of German Property in Czechoslovakia
Case, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 31-34; Graue, Germany: Recognition of Foreign
Expropriations,3 AM. J. Comp.L. 93 (1954); Confiscation of Property of Sudeten
Germans Case, [1948] ANN.DIG. 24, 25 (No. 12) (Amtsgericht of Dingolfing);
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOECHENscHRiFr 628 (1947-1948); 15 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr FUR
ANsLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT (1949).
Greece: Massouridis, The Effects of Confiscation, Expropriation,and Requisition by a ForeignAuthority, 3 REvuE HELLENIQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 62, 68
(1950).
Italy: Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 78 I1Foro Italiano Part I, 719,

[1955] Int'l L. Rep. 19 (Court of Venice 1953).
The Netherlands: Senembah Maatschappij N.V.v. Republiek Indonesie Bank
Indonesia, Ned. Jr. 1959, No. 73, at 218 (Amsterdam Ct. App.); N.V. Assurantie
Maatschappij de Nederlanded van 1845 v. P.T. Escomptobank, 33 Int'l L. Rep.
30 (Dist. Ct. The Hague 1962) aff 'd on other grounds (Hoge Rood, 1964) 40 Int'l
L. Rep. 7 (1964).
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In the United States a different approach has taken hold. In 1947
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres S.A.,1 ° 1 conceived an exception to the doctrine. That case
stands for the principle that when the executive branch, "which is

the authority to which we must look for the final word in such
matters," declares that the doctrine does not apply, the courts may
review an act of a foreign state.0 2 In a subsequent case brought by
the same plaintiff,0 3 seeking recovery of damages for conversion of
assets allegedly confiscated by the Nazi German Government in

1937-39, the Department of State explained that it was "the policy
of the Executive" to "relieve American courts from any restraint
upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of

the acts of Nazi officials."'0 4 In line with this statement of executive policy, the Second Circuit permitted the district court to
pass upon the validity of the acts of the German officials, thus
See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Iaisha [1953]
Int'l L. Rep. 305 (Dist. Ct. Tokyo), aff'd, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 312 (High Ct. of
Tokyo).
101. 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). In this
case Bernstein sought damages for conversion of his property allegedly confiscated by the Nazi German Government between 1937 and 1939. The court affirmed dismissal of the complaint holding that the act of state doctrine barred
inquiry into the validity of the Nazi confiscations, but carved out the exception
discussed in the text.
102. The court made this statement after discussing various authorities including the Declaration of June 5, 1945, which Bernstein asserted evidenced a
positive intent to relax the doctrine in the courts. 163 F.2d at 251. See Bernstein's
Brief on Appeal at 30-36; Brief of the American Jewish Congress as Amicus
Curiae, at 21-37.
103. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) which amended the mandate in Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949). The case was
ultimately settled following remand to the district court. Prior to the Supreme
Court decision in FNCB, the "Bernstein exception" was relied upon twice-both
were instances by lower courts whose decisions were subsequently reversed: Banco
Nacional de Cuba v.Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376
U.S. 398 (1964); Kane v. Institute of Agrarian Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1961), rev'd, 153 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1963).
104. See letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State,
to Bernstein's attorneys, April 13, 1949; State Department Press Release No. 296,
(April 27, 1949) 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 592, 593 (1949).
Interestingly, Jack B. Tate was also the author of the 1952 shift in United
States policy to recognize, thereafter, only public acts, jure imperii, as distinguished from private acts, jure gestionis, as immune. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 985
(1952). See also discussion on Justice White's argument for a commercial act
exception consistent with the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, text ac-

companying notes 166-90 infra.
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creating the "Bernstein exception" to the American version of the
act of state doctrine.
Limited by the facts of the Bernstein cases, the "Bernstein exception" is applicable only where: (a) the foreign sovereign, whose
acts are to be reviewed, no longer exists; (b) the executive branch

advises the court that it is the policy of the government to enable
the courts to pass upon the validity of the acts of such sovereign;
and (c) the court decides it will not be restrained by that doctrine.105 Interpreted in this way, the "Bernstein exception" is consistent with the rationale of pre-Sabbatino Supreme Court decisions on the act of state: judicial examination of the validity of the
act of a foreign state that no longer exists cannot "imperil the
amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations."' 0 This interpretation of the "Bernstein exception" is also
supported by the Sabbatino decision and is consistent with the
new rationale for the act of state doctrine set forth in that decision.
For in Sabbatino the Supreme Court indicated that the doctrine
might not bar examination of the validity of a foreign expropriation where the government involved no longer existed, 07 even as
the Court implicitly rejected a broad application of that exception. 0 '
In sharp contrast with this restrictive interpretation of the
"Bernstein exception" is the broad interpretation: once the executive branch states that its policy is to relieve the courts from the
restraints of the act of state doctrine, the courts are bound to refrain from applying the doctrine whether or not the government
involved still exists.0 9 Thus, under this interpretation it is the
Executive, not the courts, who invokes the "Bernstein exception.", 0
B.

The Rationale Set Forth in Sabbatino

In his majority opinion (8-1) in Sabbatino, Justice Harlan dis-

carded the notions of sovereignty, comity, and international law as
105. Delson, supra note 7, at 90.
106. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304.
107. 376 U.S. at 428. The "Bernstein exception" may be valid "if the government which perpetrated the challenged act of state is no longer in existence." Id.
Also, the Court stated: "This Court has never had occasion to pass upon the socalled Bernstein exception, nor need it do so now." Id. at 420.
108. See 376 U.S. at 432-33, 436. See also Justice Powell's opinion in FNCB,
406 U.S. at 773, and Justice Brennan's opinion in that case, 406 U.S. at 785-93.
109. See Justice Rehnquist's opinion in the FNCB case, 406 U.S. at 768, and
Judge Hays dissenting from the Second Circuit decision in the FNCB case, 442
F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
110. See text accompanying notes 132-47 infra.
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the bases for the doctrine."' Rather, the opinion goes on to state
that the act of state doctrine, which is exclusively a rule of federal
law,"' "arises out of the basic relationships between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers." ' 3 In other words,
the doctrine arises from the "constitutional" or fundamental sepa-

ration of the judicial from the political branches of government.'"
It is not, however, required by any specific article or section of the

United States Constitution."5 Furthermore, the doctrine's continuing vitality "depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches
of the Government on matters of foreign affairs.""' Justice Harlan
related the doctrine to a basic principle of political philosophy, the
principle of separation of powers. As a corollary, where the political
(foreign affairs) and judicial functions of government are separated
and administered by independent institutions, the judicial branch
must show restraint in dealing with issues relating to foreign relations lest the judiciary interfere with or disrupt the government's
conduct of those relations. For this reason the act of state doctrine
is not peculiarly an American rule of law, and precedents from
other countries may be relevant and persuasive." ' 7
111. 376 U.S. at 411-12, 421-23. However, Justice Harlan stated that "historic
notions of sovereign authority do bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of
state doctrine." Id. at 421.
112. Justice Harlan was emphatic on this point. The act of state doctrine is a
rule of federal law applicable in diversity and federal question cases alike. Accordingly, the scope of the doctrine is determined by federal law. 376 U.S. at 424-27.
113. Id. at 423.
114. Clearly, this constitutional separation is common to the organization of
the institutions of government in a great many contemporary states.
115. 376 U.S. at 423, 427. Conversely, the Constitution does not irrevocably
remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of
state. Id. at 428.
116. Id. at 427-28. However, Justice Harlan stated that the doctrine is not "an

inflexible and all-encompassing rule," for the weaker the impact-of an issue on
our foreign relations, "the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political
branches." Id. at 428. Nor can it be thought that "every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. at 423.
117. See note 100 supra.
Great Britain: F&K Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [1954]
1 W.L.R. 139 (Q.B.); Lorentzen v. Lydden & Co. [1942] 2 K.B. 202; Banco de
Vizcaya v. Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria [1935] 1 K.B. 140; Princess Paloy
Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 K.B. 718 (C.A.); Luther v. James Sager & Co. [1921] 3
K.B. 532 (C.A.); Lepage v. San Paulo Coffee Estates Co. [1917] W.N. 216 (High
Ct. of Justice, Ch. Div.); Attorney-General for 1 Canada v. William Schulze &
Co. [1901] 9 Scots L.T. Reps. 4 (Outer House); Don Alonso v. Cornero, Hob. 213,
80 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B.); Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch.
1674).
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Justice Harlan further reasoned that international law does not
forbid application of the doctrine, even if it is claimed that the act
of state in question violated international law."' Nor can the public law of nations dictate to a country that is wronged how to treat
that wrong within its borders.' 9 Moreover, he contended that the
plain implication of the Oetjen case'20 and Shapleigh v. Mier"' is
that the act of state doctrine is applicable even if international law
has been violated.' In support of this view Justice Harlan reasoned that the judicial branch is, by contrast with the political
branch, limited in what it can do following an expropriation of any
significance.lu Judicial determinations of invalidity of title would
Austria: Hungarian Soviet Government Case, Supreme Court in Civil Matters
of Austria, (ObI, 1055/22), [1922] E.O.G.Z. 274 (No. 110), [1919-1922] Ann.
Dig. 56 (No. 31).
Belgium: Propetrol, Petroservice, et Petrolest v. Compania Mexicano de Petroleo, Civil Tribunal of Antwerp, [1939] Belgique Judiciaire 11. 12, [1938-1940]
Ann. Dig. 25 (No. 11).
France: Soci~t6 Hardmuth, Court of Appeal of Paris, Dec. 2, 1950, 44 Rev. Cr.
Dr. Int'l Priv. 501 (1955); De Keller v. Maison de la Pensee Francaise, Tribunal
de la Seine, July 12, 1954, 44 Rev. Cr. Dr. Int'l Priv. 503 (1955), [1954] Int'l L.
Rep. 21, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1955); Martin v. Banque d'Espagne, Cour de
Cassation, Nov. 3, 1952, 42 Rev. Cr. Dr. Int'l Priv. 425 (1953), [1952] Int'l L. Rep.
202 (No. 42); Lamasquitu et l'etat Espagnol v. Soci~t6 Cemetos Rezola, Court of
Appeal of Poitiers, Dec. 20, 1937, [1938] Sirey Im. 68, [1935-1937] Ann. Dig. 196
(No. 71).
Germany: Prince Dabisita-Kotromaiez v. Socifth Lepke, Tribunal of Berlin,
Nov. 1, 1928, 56 Clunet 184 (1929).
The Netherlands: N.V. Assurantie Maatschappij de Nederlanden van 1845 v.
P.T. Escomptobank, 33 Int'l L. Rep. 30 (Dist. Ct. The Hague 1962), aff'd on other
grounds (Hoge Rood, 1964) 40 Int'l L. Rep. 7 (1964); Petroservice S.A. & Credit

Minier Franco-Roumain S.A. v. Compania Mexicana de Petroleo "El Aguila",
[1940] Ned. Jur. No. 27, (Court of Appeal of the Hague, 1939), aff'd on other
grounds, [1941] Ned. Jur. No. 923, [1919-1942 Supp.] Ann. Dig. 17 (No. _-);

Davis en Cy. v. Compania Mexicana de Petroleo "El Aguila", [1939] Ned. Jur.
No. 747, [1919-1942 Supp.] Ann. Dig. 19 (No. ) (District Ct. of Rotterdam);
United States of Mexico v. N.V. De Bataatsche Petroleum Maatschappij, [1938]
Ned. Jur. No. 790, [1919-1942 Supp.] Ann. Dig. 16 (No. 7) (District Court of
Middleburg).
118. 376 U.S. at 422. Compare cases cited in note 100 supra.
119. Id. at 423.
120. 246 U.S. at 304.
121. 299 U.S. at 471.
122. 376 U.S. at 431. Compare text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
Dissenting in Sabbatino, Justice White argued that prior Supreme Court decisions do not support the assertion that "foreign acts of state must be enforced...
in American courts when they violate the law of nations." 376 U.S. at 441.
123. Id. at 431. And the Court is powerless to implement a decision on a
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be likely to give offense to the expropriating country, could "seriously interfere with negotiations" by the executive branch with

such country, might affect an agreement that could otherwise be
reached with that country, and would undoubtedly color relations
with third countries engaged in similar expropriations.' Nor are
such dangers removed if the State Department asserts that the
relevant act violated international law, for the stamp of judicial
disapproval of the State Department's views might strengthen the
hand of the expropriating state in negotiations. Also, the courts
might undermine policies of the executive branch as the organ of
American foreign policy by contradicting views expressed by the
State Department. Expression of judicial uncertainty might well
embarrass the Executive or at least "render uncertain titles in
foreign commerce."' 25 The Court rejected the argument that if the
doctrine is not applied where the act of state violates international
law, the resulting economic pressure will materially add to the
protection of United States investors. Instead, the Court noted
that the United States possesses a variety of means far more effective than judicial invalidation of acts of expropriation for securing
investments in foreign nations; that foreign aid given to states in
need of continuing foreign investment "provides a powerful lever
in the hands of the political branches to ensure fair treatment" of
American investment; that the sanctions of economic embargo and
freezing of assets may be employed; and that if the political
branches are unwilling to exercise their powers to effect compensation, this reflects a judgment which the judiciary should not undermine. 6 Finally, the Court said without elaboration that maintain-

ing the act of state doctrine serves to promote the "goal of establishing the rule of law among nations."'
C. FNCB Case: Divergent Rationales
In the most recent Supreme Court case before Dunhill, First
2 the Sabbatino
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,"'
political issue. Contra Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
124. 376 U.S. at 431-32.
125. Id. at 433.
126. Id. at 435-36. This argument was again asserted by the Solicitor General
in the FNCB case. See, Lowenfeld, supra note 18, at 807.
127. 376 U.S. at 437. The International Court of Justice has refused to be
drawn into the issue. Barcelona Traction Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3.
128. 406 U.S. 759, rehearingdenied, 409 U.S. 897 (1972), aff'd on remand, 478
F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973). For previous opinions in the case see: 270 F. Supp. 1004

Fall 1976]

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

rationale for the act of state doctrine was torn asunder. In his
opinion in the FNCB case Justice Rehnquist, speaking for himself,
the Chief Justice and Justice White, reverted in part to the preSabbatino rationale. He pointed out that the act of state doctrine,
like the sovereign immunity doctrine, is judicially created. It has
its roots in the notion of comity among independent sovereigns and

among the respective branches of the federal government. Furthermore, it is buttressed by judicial deference to the primary and
exclusive power of the Executive over the conduct of relations with
other sovereign powers. 29 Justice Rehnquist emphatically asserted
that the doctrine "justifies its existence primarily on the basis that
juridical review of acts of state of a foreign power could embarrass
the conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (granting summary judgment for FNCB), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d
Cir. 1970). The decision of the Second Circuit was vacated and remanded for
reconsideration based upon the Bernstein letter dated November 7, 1970, from
John R. Stevenson, State Department Legal Advisor to Hon. E. Robert Seaver,
Clerk, United States Supreme Court. On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Second Circuit affirmed its original decision (2 to 1) and rejected the "Bernstein
exception," 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1972) and the Supreme Court again granted
certiorari. The Supreme Court's opinions on this second review are the ones
discussed in the text. See Delson, supra note 7; Leigh, The Supreme Court and
the Sabbatino Watchers: FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
13 VA. J. INT'L L. 33 (1972); Lowenfeld, supra note 18.
The Supreme Court again remanded the case to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals for "consideration of [Banco de Cuba's] alternative bases of attack on
the judgment of the District Court" which were: (1) that FNCB's counterclaim
did not lie against Banco de Cuba, because it was directed against the government of Cuba not against Banco de Cuba; and (2) the nationalization of FNCB's
property in Cuba did not violate international law. The Second Circuit rejected
both these contentions saying that the undisputed evidence shows that Banco de
Cuba and Cuba "acted as one" in the nationalization, and that the court's decisions in Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), reversed, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), and
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d'Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 956 (1967), established that the actions of the government of Cuba and
Banco Nacional "were violations of international law" in the instant case. 478
F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973).
That the Second Circuit decisions in Sabbatino, both before and after the
Supreme Court decision, enunciate a rule of international law applicable in cases
involving confiscations of the property of foreign nationals is uncertain, for, the
Supreme Court ruling in Sabbatino rested in part upon the conclusion that "there
are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so
divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens." 376 U.S. at 428.
129. 406 U.S. at 762, 765. Accord, Judge Hays' dissent in Banco Nactional de
Cuba v. First National City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 538 (2d Cir. 1971).
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government,"' 3 and he agreed that it is grounded primarily on the
basis that judicial review through the normal adjudicative process
of the acts of a foreign power could frustate the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive. 3' In formulating this rationale for the
act of state doctrine, Justice Rehnquist adopted and approved a
broad view of the "Bernstein exception," saying:
We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it is with
primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly
represents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine
would not advance the interests of American foreign policy, that
doctrine should not be applied by the courts. In so doing, we of
course adopt and approve the so-called Bernstein exception to the
32
act of state doctrine.
Justice Douglas concurred in the result. In his view, however, the
act of state doctrine, as set forth in Sabbatino, did not control the
central issue in FNCB.3 3 Rather, the case is governed by National
City Bank v. Republic of China,34 which established that a foreign
government suing to recover money in the courts of the United
States could not as a matter of "fair dealing" assert sovereign
immunity to bar a counterclaim for an amount equal to the
amount claimed by the government. Like China, the Government
of Cuba invoked our law, and it would "offend our sensibilities if
Cuba" could "have our law free from the claims of justice.' ' 3 In
effect, if a foreign sovereign seeks redress in the courts of the
United States it may not effectively assert the act of state doctrine
to bar any valid counterclaim or setoff which may be interposed. 13
130. 406 U.S. at 765.
131. Id. at 765, 767-68.
132. Id. at 768. Thus, reasons Justice Rehnquist, where the reason for the law

-to assure the executive branch a free hand in the conduct of foreign relationsceases, the law itself is no longer applicable. Id. Justice Rehnquist argues that
"the result we reach is consonant with the principles of equity set forth by the
Court" in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) discussed

at notes 134-37 infra.
133. 406 U.S. at 770-73 (Douglas, J.).
134. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
135.

406 U.S. at 771-72.

136. Sabbatinoimplicitly rejected this line of argument and distinguished any
asserted analogy to the Republic of China case. 376 U.S. at 437-38.
In both the Republic of China and FNCB cases, FNCB waived its right to an
affirmative recovery in damages on its counterclaims over and above the amount
of China's and Cuba's respective claims. Thus, the Supreme Court never passed
upon the validity of an affirmative recovery, but Justice Douglas elevated
FNCB's litigation tactic into an asserted rule of law on the theory that, while "fair

Fall 19761

THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE

Finally, Justice Douglas rejected the broad view of the "Bernstein
exception" endorsed in the Rehnquist opinion: "[O]therwise the
Court becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which
may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not
1 37
others." 1

Justice Powell concurred in the judgment. 13 He stated that although Sabbatino "technically reserves the question of the validity
of the 'Bernstein exception' "-the reasoning of "Sabbatino implicitly rejects that exception"-at least as interpreted by Justice
Rehnquist. Moreover, Republic of China is not dispositive. Although attracted by the theory of Justice Douglas, he found little
support for the proposition that the "counterclaim is justifiable
up to, but no further than, the point of setoff."'' Rather, his
concurrence is based on the view that Sabbatino improperly
applied the act of state doctrine: "I am not prepared to say that
international law may never be determined and applied by the
'
judiciary where there has been an 'act of state'."14
Nor does
the separation of powers dictate the abdiction of the judiciary's
responsibility to resolve grievances by the judicial process. "To
so argue," says Justice Powell, "is to assume that there is no such
thing as international law but only international political disputes
that can be resolved only by the exercise of power."'' He concludes that only where there is a conflict in the rules of the political
and judicial branches should the courts invoke the act of state
doctrine and abstain from determining a dispute.
In his dissent in the FNCB case Justice Brennan, speaking for
himself and three other Justices, took issue with Justice Rehnquist's statement of the rationale for the doctrine and adoption of
a broad "Bernstein exception." Justice Brennan stressed that the
rationale for the act of state doctrine is not primarily "to avoid
embarrassment to the political branch," and he embraced Justice
Harlan's statement in Sabbatino of the foundations of the docdealing" required the allowance of the counterclaim as a setoff, the act of state
doctrine would bar recovery on the counterclaim above the amount claimed by
Cuba. 406 U.S. at 772.
See also the Second Circuit opinion in the Menendez case, 485 F.2d at 1372-74
and the November 17, 1971, Dept. of State letter, 442 F.2d 530 at 536 et seq. (2d
Cir. 1971).
137. 406 U.S. at 773.
138. 406 U.S. 773-76 (Powell, J.).
139. Id. at 774.
140. Id. at 775.
141. Id.
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trine."' He argued that under standards of international law the
Cuban expropriation of FNCB's branches is a political question
and not cognizable in our courts.' But he stated that the task of
"defining the contours of a political question" for purposes of the
act of state doctrine "is exclusively the function of this Court;" and
that the "Bernstein exception as engrafted on the act of state
doctrine by Justice Rehnquist relinquishes this task to the Executive" by requiring blind adherence to the Executive's requests that
foreign acts of state be reviewed, thus "politicizing the judiciary."
Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted that under the "Bernstein
exception" as adopted, equal treatment to litigants would be lost,
for the "fate of the individual claimant would be subject to the
political considerations of the Executive Branch." He criticized
Bernstein because "the determination of international law is made
to depend upon a prior political authorization," thus undermining
the decisions of the courts as "dispassionate opinions of principle."'' 4 Moreover, as a result of the Court's decision, FNCB gained
a preference at the expense of other claimants whose property had
been nationalized by Cuba, contrary to the intent of the United
States Foreign Claims Settlement laws.' Justice Brennan also
142. See text accompanying notes 111-27 supra.
143. 406 U.S. at 788, 789. The characterization of this question as a political
question is based upon "the absence of consensus of applicable international
rules, the unavailability of standards from a treaty or other agreement, the existence and recognition of the Cuban Government, the sensitivity of the issues to
national concerns, and the power of the Executive alone to effect a fair remedy
for all United States citizens who have been harmed. . ." Id. at 788.
Justice Brennan pointed out that the executive branch, despite its powers in
the area of foreign affairs, "cannot by simple stipulation change a political question into a cognizable claim." Id. at 789. Justice Douglas concurred in this view.
Id. at 772. But, said Justice Brennan, the representations of the Department of
State, although not determinative, are entitled to weight "for the light they shed
on the permutation and combination of factors underlying the act of state doctrine." Id. at 790.
144. 406 U.S. at 793. But see Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 at 267 (1962).
145. In 1964 Congress enacted subchapter V of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, which relates to claims against Cuba. 22 U.S.C. §§ 16431643K (1970). Congress provided for "the determination of the amount and validity of claims against the Government of Cuba" arising out of "nationalization,
expropriation, intervention or other takings" of property of United States nationals. Clearly the expropriation of FNCB's branches in Cuba gave rise to a claim
of the sort which Congress intended to submit to the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission. 22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a) (1970). Moreover, Congress and the Executive
Branch have acted, pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app.
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rejected as inapposite Justice Rehnquist's reliance on an analogy
to the Republic of China case and Justice Douglas' sole reliance
on that case.' 46 He emphasized that his disagreement with Justice
Rehnquist touched on the fundamental issue concerning the division of functions between the executive and judicial branches.'47
Significantly, six of the nine Justices in FNCB rejected the broad
"Bernstein exception" with its required "Bernstein letter.""' 8 They
agreed, rather, that the Supreme Court, not the executive branch,
must define the role of the judiciary.
In Dunhill Justice White, speaking for himself and three others,
reemphasized the rationale for the act of state doctrine set forth
by Justice Rehnquist in FNCB. Justice White said: "The major
underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing
court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states
on their own soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our
Government in the conduct of our foreign relations."'' The Dunhill dissent adopted Justice Brennan's argument in FNCB, noting
"that the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign is, under some
circumstances, a 'political question' not cognizable in our
courts."1 0 Thus, the theoretical basis for the doctrine remains un-

settled.
But the Court did not discuss the Bernstein-Republic of China
analysis applied by the Second Circuit in Dunhill. Nor did they
discuss the "Bernstein exception"'' or the Republic of China
case. 5' However, five Justices affirmed that it is the task of the
judiciary, not the executive branch, to decide whether deference
to the political branches of government requires application of the
§ 5 (1970), to block all Cuban assets present in the United States. Proc. 3447, 3
C.F.R. 1959-1963 Comp. at 157 (1962). Through its success in this litigation
FNCB has circumvented this system of claims submission and blocking of assets.
146. 406 U.S. at 793-96.
147. Further, Justice Brennan notes that the "Bernstein exception" assigns
the task of advocating an international standard on expropriations to the courts,
thus countenancing an exchange of roles between the judiciary and the executive
"contrary to the firm insistence in Sabbatino on the separation of powers." 406
U.S. at 791-92.
148. 406 U.S. at 770-73, 776-77.
149. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4670.
150. Id. at 4679.
151. The dissent refers to Bernstein, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4678.
152. The State Department argued that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
does not prevent entry of an affirmative judgment. See Id. at 4670, n.12, 4673-

74; note 136 supra.

a
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act of state doctrine.'53 Nor did Justice White treat the State Department letter furnished in this case as controlling, but he did
give it prominence in his decision. 54' Nevertheless, the potentially
intractable issues which might be generated by the interaction of
the Hickenlooper amendment and the "Bernstein exception" may
never arise.'55 The Court's silence in Dunhill on Bernstein may
signal the decline if not the demise of the broad "Bernstein exception," although courts and litigants may still wish to solicit the
views of the State Department to ascertain whether the executive
branch'56 will be embarrassed. The focus, however, has shifted
away from the basis for the act of state doctrine to a possible
commercial act exception to the doctrine.
VII.

ASSERTION BY A SOVEREIGN OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN
OPPOSITION TO A COUNTERCLAIM

At the heart of the Dunhill case are the issues regarding the
rights and obligations of the Cuban Government interventors who
took possession of the businesses and assets of the cigar manufacturers. Especially at issue is the question whether Dunhill is enti-

tled to an affirmative judgment on its counterclaim against the
Cuban Government for amounts mistakenly paid to it for preintervention shipments of cigars, or whether Dunhill is barred from
judgment on its counterclaim by the act of state doctrine. In
Dunhill no claim was made that the interventors were an entity
separate, distinct, and independent from the Cuban Government.' 7 Moreover, Cuba had actively sought and been granted

permission to intervene in the original litigation by the former
153. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4675 (Powell, J.), 4678.
154.

Id. at 4673-74.

155. See Professor Lowenfeld's penetrating analysis, Act of State and Department of State: FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, supra note
18.
156. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4670. See also text accompanying notes 118-22 supra. In
its letter to the Court the State Department stated: "In general this Department's
experience provides little support for a presumption that adjudication of acts of
foreign states in accordance with relevant principles of international law would
embarrass the conduct of foreign policy." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4674.
157. Compare the FNCB case. There Banco de Cuba argued that FNCB's
counterclaim would not lie against it because that was a claim against the Cuban
Government and Banco de Cuba was a separate and independent entity, not an
instrumentality of the sovereign. The Second Circuit rejected this argument as
not in accord with fact. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank,
478 F.2d 191,193-94 (2d Cir. 1973).
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owners against the importers, so that it could pursue claims for
debts due from the importers for cigars shipped after intervention. "' 8 Thus, a sovereign, Cuba, had sued for affirmative relief
in the courts of the United States, once again raising the question
whether the act of state doctrine can be invoked against a counterclaim by a sovereign suing in American courts.
In the Sabbatino case the Supreme Court seemingly disposed of
this issue. The Court's conclusions were as follows: (1) that Cuba's
status as a plaintiff did not make the act of state doctrine inapplicable, for "the rebuke to a recognized power would be more
'
(2) that if the doctrine
pointed were it a suitor in our courts;"159
were inapplicable it might "sanction self-help remedies, something hardly conducive to a peaceful international order;"1 0 (3)
that the forum should not "simply apply its own law to all the
relevant transactions;" ' ' and, (4) that the asserted analogy to the
Republic of China case was inapposite because "The act of state
doctrine . . . although it shares with the immunity doctrine a
respect for sovereign states, concerns the limits for determining
the validity of an otherwise applicable rule of law."16
This view of the issue was confirmed by Justice Brennan's dissent in the FNCB case.1 13 However, Justice Douglas reopened the
issue with his concurrence in the FNCB case by relying on the
rationale in the Republic of China that "fair dealing" requires
recognition of any counterclaim or setoff that eliminates or reduces
the sovereign's claim."8 4 The Second Circuit relied on Justice Douglas' argument in Republic of China to reach its decision in the
Dunhill case, but the Supreme Court did not address this issue on
appeal. Instead, both majority and dissent assumed that Cuba and
the interventors could assert the act of state doctrine as a bar to
' Thus, final resolution of this issue
the quasi-contractual claim. 65
must await another case.
158. F. Palicio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd,
375 F. 2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, Brush v. Republic of Cuba, 389 U.S.
830 (1967).
159. 376 U.S. at 437.
160. Id.at 438.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 406 U.S. at 795-96.
164. Id. at 770-73.
165. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4667-68, 4676.
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VIII. AN EXCEPTION TO THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE FOR "PURELY
COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS"

The most important new departure brought by the Dunhill decision is Justice White's articulation of a new limitation on the act
of state doctrine: an exception for "purely commercial operations."
Like the Court in FNCB, the Court in Dunhill was seeking a limitation on the broad sweep given the act of state doctrine in
Sabbatino. The attempted engrafting of the "Bernstein exception"
to the doctrine in FNCB, with its attendant subservience to the

views of the executive branch, was apparently unsatisfactory to
the Dunhill Court. While the Dunhill Court found that the act of
repudiation was not an act of state, four Justices, led by Justice
White, would have decided the case on the additional basis that
the act was "purely commercial" in nature and not protected from
review by the act of state doctrine.
Justice White argued that the concept of an act of state should
not be extended to include the repudiation of a "purely commercial obligation" owed by a foreign sovereign or one of its commercial instrumentalities.'66 The dissent stated that a commercial act
exception was not appropriate in the Dunhill case, but reserved its
position on whether, and under what circumstances, such an exception might be appropriate. The dissent then commented on the

proffered rationale for the exception.1 7 Justice Stevens did not
address the issue. 68' Whether the Court will eventually accept a
commercial act exception is thus an open issue.
Justice White distinguished between the public or governmental acts of a sovereign state and its private or commercial acts., 9
He stated that the quasi-contractual obligation to repay Dunhill
arose from the operation of the cigar businesses as a commercial
business by Cuba's agents, the interventors. Hence, the case is
no different from a case where the buyer overpays for goods sold
by a commercial business operated by a foreign government-a
commonplace occurrence in international commerce.17 ° In order
166. Id. at 4669.
167. Id. at 4678. See text infra at note 174.
168. Id. at 4676.
169. Id. at 4669, quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of United States v.
Planters'Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824). See also the State

Department letter dated November 26, 1975, 44 U.S.L.W. 4673-74 (1976).

170. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4670 n.11. Justice Marshall for the dissent finds it difficult to accept Justice White's characterization of the course of conduct involved
as "purely commercial." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4680 n.16.
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to avoid embarrassing conflicts with the executive branch which
would transgress the major underpinning of the act of state doctrine, the Court is in no sense "compelled to recognize the purely
commercial conduct of foreign governments as an act of state in
order to avoid embarrassing conflicts with the Executive Branch."
On the contrary, ".

.

. we fear that embarrassment and conflict

would more likely ensue if we were to require" recognition of the
repudiation as an act of state.'
In arguing for the exception, Justice White placed primary emphasis on the consistency of the exception with the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity. The restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity appears to be the generally accepted or prevailing law
in the United States and has been the official policy of the United
States Government since 1952.172 Thus it follows that:
Repudiation of a commercial debt cannot, consistent with this
restrictive approach to sovereign immunity, be treated as an act of
state; for if it were, foreign governments, by merely repudiating the
debt before or after its adjudication, would enjoy an immunity
which our government would not extend to them under prevailing
sovereign immunity principles in this country. This would undermine the policy supporting the restrictive view of immunity.

....

The dissent issued a sharp reply. Justice Marshall pointed out that
the two doctrines, while related, "differ fundamentally in their
focus and in their operation." Whereas sovereign immunity accords a defendant an exemption from suit by virtue of its status,
the act of state doctrine merely tells a court what law to apply to
a case.Y4 In rejoinder Justice White stated that the proper applica171. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4670.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§ 69 (1971); Tate letter, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4674-75 App. 2. See note 104 supra.
The Supreme Court as yet has not adopted the restrictive view of Marshall's
dissent, 44 U.S.L.W. at 4679. Justice White labors to show that Berizzi Bros. Co.
v. The Pesaro,271 U.S. 562 (1926), is no longer the law. Recently the Departments
of State and Justice have jointly proposed legislation to codify restrictive or
limited sovereign immunity, H.R. 3493, S. 566, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See
Comm. Rep't, 30 [Record of N.Y.C.B.A.] 301-305 (1975); Atkeson, Perkins &
Wyatt, H.R. 11315-The Revised State-Justice Bill on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Time for Action, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 298 (1976).
173. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4670. An increasing number of foreign states have
adopted the restrictive view. See citations set forth in 44 U.S.L.W. at 4671 n.15.
See also European Convention on Sovereign Immunity, 11 INT'L L. MAT. 470
(1972).
174. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4679. CompareJustice Douglas' views in FNCB, with text
accompanying notes 133-37 supra.
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tion of each involves a "balancing of the injury to our foreign
policy."'' 5 Justice White also offered a more practical justification.
He said that the participation of foreign sovereigns in international
commerce has increased substantially in recent years, thus increasing the potential injury to international trade from a system
in which some of the participants are not subject to the rule of law.
In commercial matters foreign sovereigns do not exercise powers
peculiar to sovereigns. They exercise powers exercised by private
citizens. Accordingly, the more discernible rules of international
law regarding commercial dealings' 6 should be applied to the commercial transactions of sovereign states. Furthermore, subjecting
states to these rules of law is "unlikely to touch very sharply on
'national nerves.'"77 Justice White concluded by saying that because the act relied on by the interventors was an act in "the
operation of cigar businesses for profit, the act was not an act of
state."' 8 "If the act is a commercial act whether the actor is insovereign authority is immaterial; the act
vested with or exercising
' 79
state.'
of
act
an
not
is
The dissent questions, in a general criticism, the wisdom of attempting to articulate any broad exception to the act of state doctrine within the confines of a single case. It favors the case-by-case
approach.'80 Certainly if a commercial act exception to or limita175.

44 U.S.L.W. at 4672 n.18.

176. Here Justice White comes close to the notion that acts of state in the
commercial area are subject to review under international law standards.
See LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL PRWATE TRADE 1-2 (1975); Gal, The Commercial
Law of Nations and the Law of InternationalTrade, 6 CORN. INT'L L.J. 55, 64
(1972); Pajski, The Law of InternationalTrade of Some EuropeanSocialist Countries and East-West Trade Relations, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 125, 137; Schmithoff,
The Unificationor Harmonizationof Law by Means of Standard Contracts and
GeneralConditions, 17 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 551, 563-64 (1968). See also Goldstein,
InternationalConventions and Standard Contracts as a Means of Escapingfrom
the Application of Municipal Law; Jonasco, The Limits of Party Autonomy;
Knapp, The Function, Organizationand Activities of ForeignTrade Corporations
in the European Socialist Countries; Trammer, The Law of ForeignTrade in the
Legal Systems of the Countries of Planned Economy, in THE SOURCES

OF THE LAW

(Schmitthoff, ed. 1964).
177. Justice White then states that: ". . . the mere assertion of sovereignty
as a defense to a claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign sovereign

OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

is no more effective if given the label 'Act of State' than if it is given the label
'sovereign immunity'." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4672.
178. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4673.
179. See text accompanying notes 66-90 supra.
180. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4679.
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tion of the act of state doctrine is to be accepted, much litigation
is ahead before the contours of such an exception will be known.
Justice White leaves unanswered a number of key questions.
For example, if the commercial act exception is based upon the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, are we then to look to the

cases and practice on sovereign immunity to discern the scope of
the commercial act exception? If so, we are thrust into yet another
legal thicket. If we look solely to the cases, they offer guidelines
that are far from clear."8 ' On the other hand, under the Tate letter 182 procedure, a request is made to the State Department for its
position on the immunity of a foreign sovereign power. After informal hearing, the State Department, through the Attorney General,
communicates its opinion to the courts. This "suggestion of immunity" by the Department is generally deferred to by the court.1m
Thus, under the commercial act exception the courts may be no
better off than they are under the "Bernstein exception"-subject
to the political decisions of the executive branch.'84 There is some
hope, however, that this dependence of the judiciary on the executive may be ended, for legislation is now pending in Congress to
place determinations of immunity solely in the courts.'85 But enactment of that bill would then raise the further question of
whether the commercial act exception proposed by Justice White
will be construed as broadly as the restrictions on sovereign immunity in the bill or simply as broadly as the "commercial activity" restriction as defined in that bill.188 If, on the other hand, the
181. See Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria
General, 336 F.2d 354, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965);
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd, 295 F.2d
24 (4th Cir. 1961); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134,
215 A.2d 864 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966); Falk, The Immunity of
Foreign Sovereigns in United States Courts, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473
(1973); Leigh & Atkeson, Due Process in the Emerging ForeignRelations Law of
the United States-II, 22 Bus. LAW. 3, 15-23 (1966).
182. See notes 104, 163 supra.
183. Atkeson, Perkins & Wyatt, supra note 163, at 301.

184. For criticism of judicial deference to the State Department compare
Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?,40 Am. J. INT'L
L. 168 (1946) with Justice Brennan's dissent in FNCB at text accompanying notes
142-47 supra and Lowenfeld, supra note 18.

185. H.R. 11315 in 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 313-21 (1976).
186. The bill defines commercial activity in § 1603(d) as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act."
Section-by-Section Analysis, 15 INT'L L. MAT. 102 (1976), cites as examples of
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commercial act exception is not meant to necessarily follow the
contours of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the scope
of the proposed exception is even less discernible.
In either event, whether subject to the limits of the restrictive
theory or not, the term "commercial" needs definition. Does commercial conduct or activity include the sale of oil, coal, bauxite,
sugar cane, copper, or other commodity?8 7 What if the commodity

were still in the ground or growing in the field-would a purported
expropriation reach it? What if the commodity were mined or harvested but in storage awaiting shipment? What if the commodity
were loaded on a ship but within the territorial waters of the selling
country-would an expropriation reach it?' What if the commodity were on board ship on the high seas in ships of the country of
origin-would an expropriation reach it? Or, again, is the purchase
of a commercial enterprise a commercial act? Apparently the expropriation of a commercial enterprise is not a commercial act.'89
Moreover, the Court did not recognize or comment ipon the
Bernstein-Republicof China analysis made by the Second Circuit.
It seems that Justice Douglas' argument, based upon the Republic
of China case,"' has been bypassed by Justice White's commercial
act exception, based as it is on the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity. Furthermore, no member of the Court spoke out on
behalf of the broad "Bernstein exception," but if "commercial act"
does not include foreign expropriations, perhaps the "Bernstein
exception" may only be in decline or disfavor and yet waiting for
resurrection. For all the unanswered questions, pitfalls, and criticisms, a commercial act exception may be a practical and a judicially appropriate means of limiting the scope of the act of state
doctrine as set forth in Sabbatino.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in the Dunhill case has answered

but a few of the act of state doctrine questions raised by the
"commercial activity" "a foreign government's sale of a service or a product, its
leasing of property, its borrowing of money."
187. Justice White rules out expropriations, but without careful definition. 44
U.S.L.W. at 4672.
188. In Sabbatino the sugar was in process of being loaded onto a ship. 376
U.S. at 403. Thus, if the Court had recognized a commercial act exception, would
it have decided the Sabbatino case differently?
189. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4672.
190. See text accompanying notes 134-37 supra.
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Sabbatino and FNCB cases, and by the lower court decisions in
the Dunhill case itself. Nevertheless, we know that the act of state
doctrine is a doctrine of judicial restraint, not a limitation on the
courts' jurisdiction; that it is a principle of federal common law;
that it is not required by international law; that it overrides conflict of laws analysis; and that, as a corollary, courts will not
undertake to pass upon the validity of an official act of a foreign
state under the laws of that state. The following conclusions can
be drawn:
1. The Supreme Court has, it seems, accepted that the situs of
a debt is where the debtor can be found for purposes of the act of
state doctrine.
2. The majority of the Supreme Court would like to limit the
reach of the doctrine. In Dunhill the Court rejected the dissent's
position that the "act" involved was a course of conduct beginning
with the nationalization of the cigar businesses. Rather, the Court
said the act in question was the discreet act of repudiating the
interventors' quasi-contractual obligation.
3. In order to commit an act of state the actor must be invested
with sovereign power and exercise that power by formal or informal
affirmative action and, probably, also by intentional refusal to act.
4. While the Court cannot agree on the basis for the act of state
doctrine, the White-Rehnquist view holds that the major underpinning is the policy not to review the legality of acts of states that
might embarrass the executive branch of the Government in the
conduct of foreign relations. The Marshall-Brennan-Harlan basis
for the doctrine is more complex and in part reflects the notion that
the validity of an act of state may be a "political question" not
cognizable in our courts. In Dunhill the Court was split four-to-four
with Justice Stevens not speaking to this issue.
5. In FNCB the majority of the Justices sought to limit the
apparent broad reach of Sabbatino in various ways. One way proposed by three of the Justices was adoption of a broad "Bernstein
exception" to the doctrine. The Court has, however, apparently
drawn away from this approach and its total dependence on the
views of the executive branch. Nevertheless, a State Department
letter may be persuasive as to whether the executive branch has
been embarrassed, and in a non-commercial act case such a letter
may be controlling.
6. The Supreme Court has also stayed away from Justice

Douglas' reliance on the Republic of China case analogy.
7. A country that seeks an affirmative judgment in the courts
of the United States can assert the act of state defense to a counter-
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claim in the same case even if the counterclaim arises out of the
same transaction on which the main claim is based.
8. In Dunhill the main debate focused on Justice White's proposed commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine. The
commercial act exception holds that even if an act is done by a
person invested with sovereign power in the exercise of that power,
if the act is purely commercial in nature it may be reviewed in our
courts under applicable national and international rules of commercial law. Significantly, the dissent did not rule out the possible
validity and future relevance of a commercial act exception. It
merely said that Dunhill was not an appropriate case for its application. Also, Justice Stevens has not yet set forth his views of such
an exception.
9. Justice White said that the commercial act exception is consistent with the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, and
without the commercial act exception, the restrictive theory would
be a nullity. The dissent demurred to this argument.
The Dunhill decision is surprising in that it dealt with so few
issues of the act of state doctrine; yet it may be the watershed of a
most important commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine.

